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Mixed-Motive Jury Instructions Under the ADA and ADAAA: Are they Still Applicable in the 
Wake of Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc.? 
Corey Stein* 
I. Introduction 
Courts reviewing claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) have recently 
had difficulty determining what the appropriate standard of causation and requisite burden of 
proof should be on such claims. 1 Imagine the following scenario. An employee begins working 
at a nursing home as a registered nurse. After working for a year in that position, the employee 
develops a medical condition that causes her to have great difficulty walking, and requires the 
occasional use of a wheelchair. But the employee continues to discharge her duties as she had 
done before, albeit through the use of the wheelchair. In the meantime, her employer finds it 
inconvenient to have a disabled employee working at the facility, even though the employee 
continues to perform her job without incident. The employer cannot fire her though because the 
employer knows that the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) prevents the firing of an 
employee based merely on the fact that she is disabled. 2 As luck would have it for the employer 
though, on a single occasion, the employee has an outburst at work in which she yells at her 
supervisors. The employer takes that opportunity to fire the employee based both on the fact that 
she is disabled, as well as the fact that she had an outburst at work. 
What recourse, if any, is the employee left with at this point? As noted above, if the 
employer had fired the employee merely because the employee was disabled, then the employee 
would unquestionably be able to prevail under the ADA on a claim of unlawful employment 
'J.D. Candidate, May 2014, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.A., 2008, Rutgers University, Camden 
Campus. Thank you to Professor Charles Sullivan and Bill O'Brien for all of your assistance and helpful insight 
throughout this writing process. 
1 See, e.g., Lewis v. Humboldt Acquisition Corp., Inc., 681 F.3d 312 (6th Cir. 2012). 
2 42 u.s.c. § 12112 (2006). 
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discrimination.3 The fact that the employer now has a legitimate reason to fire the employee due 
to her outburst, in conjunction with an impermissible consideration of her disability, complicates 
this issue. What should the employee have to prove in order to prevail on her ADA claim? 
Should she be required to prove "but-for causation" (i.e., that but for her disability, she would 
not have been terminated)? Or should she be able to prevail if she is able to prove that her 
disability played any part of the employer's decision to terminate her (i.e., a "mixed-motive" or 
"motivating-factor" standard)? This question was recently answered by the Sixth Circuit on 
facts very similar to those in the hypothetical.4 
In Lewis v. Humboldt Acquisition Corp., Inc., a divided Sixth Circuit sitting en bane held 
in a 9-7 decision that a plaintiff alleging discrimination under Title I of the ADA must prove but-
for causation. 5 The plaintiff there was required to prove that, but for her disability, she would 
not have been terminated. 6 This strict causational requirement has serious consequences on a 
plaintiffs ability to prevail on an ADA claim. Going back to the original hypothetical (which 
was based generally on the facts of Lewis\ suppose that the employee was able to prove that her 
disability played some role in the employer's decision to terminate her. Under a but-for 
causation standard, this fact alone would not be sufficient to prevail. The employee would also 
have to prove that, but for this consideration, the employer would not have fired her. Put another 
way, the employee would have to prove that, if the employer was only considering legitimate 
factors such as her outburst, then the employer would not have fired her. But given the difficulty 
3 See id. ("No covered entity shall discriminate against a qualified individual with a disability because of the 
disability of such individual .... "). 
4 SeeLewis,681 F.3d312. 
5 Jd at 321. 
6 ld 
7 Seeid at313-14. 
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of proving but-for causation,8 it is likely that the employee would be able to prove only that her 
disability played a role in the employer's decision, but she would not be able to prove that it was 
the "but-for" cause. Under the but-for causation standard enunciated in Lewis, the plaintiff 
would lose the case, notwithstanding the fact that she was able to prove that her employer 
considered a discriminatory criterion in its decision to fire her. 
A rule that would require this result is wholly at odds with both the text and policies of 
the ADA. Rather, this Comment will demonstrate that the ADA calls for a mixed-
motive/motivating-factor standard of causation, where the employee has to prove only that her 
disability played a role in the employer's adverse decision. Alternatively, an ADA plaintiff is 
entitled, at a minimum, to a burden-shifting regime in which the burden is on the employer rather 
than the employee to prove that the discriminatory criterion was not the "but-for" cause of the 
adverse employment decision,9 once the plaintiff shows that her disability played a role in the 
decision. The literal language of the ADA, as well as its historical context and its legislative 
history, compel this result. 
Moreover, the new wording of the ADA under the ADA Amendments Act10 (ADAAA) 
provides an even more compelling demonstration that but-for causation is not the appropriate 
standard for the burden of proof that a Title I ADA plaintiff must bear. In 2008, Congress 
amended the ADA through the ADAAA, effectively changing the causational language of the 
ADA from "because of' to "on the basis of."11 The "because of' language of the ADA is still 
8 See Deborah A. Widiss, Undermining Congressional Overrides: The Hydra Problem in Statutory Interpretation, 
90 TEX. L. REv. 859,861 u.S (2012) (noting the difficulty that plaintiffs face in having to prove but-for causation 
when there are a mix oflegitimate and illegitimate factors that motivate an adverse employment decision). 
9 Black's Law Dictionary generally defines an "adverse employment action" as "an employer's decision that 
substantially and negatively affects an employee's job, such as a termination, demotion, or pay cut." BLACK'S LAW 
DICTIONARY 62 (9th ed. 2009). 
10 42 u.s.c. § 12112 (2006). 
11 See ADA Amendments Act of2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553 (codified as amended at 42 U.S. C.§§ 
12101-12213 (2009)). 
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relevant for pending cases because the ADAAA is not retroactive.12 But the new language 
dramatically affects the analysis of forthcoming cases in which the new language is controlling. 13 
The remainder of this Comment will provide background on the ADA and ADAAA, and 
will expand upon the arguments for why but-for causation is an inappropriate standard in these 
contexts. Part II will provide a brief overview of the ADA and its historical underpinnings. It 
will also delve further into the current controversy over the appropriate standard of causation and 
burdens of proof in an ADA case. Part III will demonstrate that a plaintiff claiming 
discrimination under the ADA is entitled to the same mixed-motive standard that Title VII 
plaintiffs enjoy, notwithstanding the flawed reasoning of Lewis. Part IV will discuss a potential 
alternative to granting an ADA plaintiff the full benefits of a Title VII mixed-motive standard. It 
will show that, based on the language of the ADA, the intent of Congress, and the historical 
context surrounding the implementation of the ADA, an ADA plaintiff is entitled, at the very 
least, to the burden-shifting framework established in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins. 14 Part V 
will discuss the effect that the ADAAA has on this analysis. That Section will argue that, based 
on the new causationallanguage under the ADAAA as well as Congress's reasons for amending 
the ADA, there is an even more compelling argument for applying a mixed-motive standard to 
cases brought under the ADA as amended. Finally, Part VI will conclude that a mixed-motive 
standard of causation applies to both the ADA and the ADAAA. 
12 See, e.g., Lewis, 681 F.3d 312. 
13 See infra Part V for a more detailed account of the interplay between the ADA and the ADAAA, as well as the 
continuing relevance of the "because of' language found in the ADA. 
14 490 u.s. 228 (1989). 
4 
II. History ofthe ADA and its Link to Title VII 
Congress passed the ADA in 1990 to address discrimination against disabled individuals 
in different areas, including employmentY More specifically, the purposes of the ADA are to 
"provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination 
against individuals with disabilities" and "to provide clear, strong, consistent, enforceable 
standards addressing discrimination against individuals with disabilities."16 The ADA was 
"[p ]assed with overwhelming majorities in both houses of Congress .... " 17 
Title I of the ADA provides that "[n]o covered entity shall discriminate against a 
qualified individual with a disability because of the disability of such individual in regard to job 
application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, employee 
compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment."18 In 
order to prevail on a claim of discrimination under Title I, a plaintiff must prove three things: 
I) he has a "disability" as defined under the statute; 2) he is qualified for the position, or at least 
he would be qualified if his employer gave him a reasonable accommodation; and 3) his 
employer discriminated against him "because of' his disability. 19 This Comment focuses on the 
controversy surrounding the third of these elements. 
A. Early Jurisprudence Defining the "Because of' Phraseology 
In order to understand what this "because of' phrase means in the context of the ADA, it 
is prudent to first address how courts were interpreting this language in other contexts at the time 
15 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (2006) (recognizing that "discrimination against individuals with disabilities persists in such 
critical areas as employment, housing, public accommodations, education, transportation, communication, 
recreation, institutionalization, health services, voting, and access to public services"). 
16 42 u.s.c. § 12101(b)(l}-{2) (2006). 
17 Michael Selmi, Interpreting the Americans with Disabilities Act: Why the Supreme Court Rewrote the Statute, and 
Why Congress Did Not Care, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 522, 523 (2008). 
18 42 U.S.C. § 12112 (2006) (emphasis added). 
19 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111-12112 (2006); see also John L. Flynn, Mixed-Motive Causation Under the ADA: Linked 
Statutes, Fuzzy Thinking, and Clear Statements, 83 GEO. L.J. 2009, 2013 (1995). 
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that Congress passed the ADA. Prior to the enactment of the ADA, other employment 
discrimination statutes such as Title VII and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act 
(ADEA) used the same "because of' phraseology_2° The first major decision to interpret this 
language was Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,21 which addressed the meaning of "because of' in 
the context of a Title VII claim. 
In Price Waterhouse, the Supreme Court established the applicable standard of causation 
and burden of proof in a Title VII discrimination case where there is a mix of legitimate and 
illegitimate factors that motivate an adverse employment decision. 22 Title VII states that it is 
unlawful for an employer to discriminate against an employee "because of such individual's 
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin .... "23 Justice Brennan, on behalf of a four Justice 
plurality, concluded that Congress intended Title VII to prevent employers from taking 
impermissible factors like sex into account when making employment decisions. 24 Based on this 
finding, Justice Brennan concluded that the words "because of' meant that the impermissible 
factor must be completely irrelevant to the making of an employment decision.25 Put in practical 
application, under this holding, if an employer considers an impermissible factor like sex along 
with legitimate factors when making an employment decision, then the decision is said to be 
made "because of' the impermissible factor.26 In essence, according to the plurality, a plaintiff 
in a Title VII case bears only the burden of establishing that his race, sex, etc. was a motivating 
20 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(I) (2006) ("It shaH be an unlawful employment practice for an employer ... to 
discriminate against any individual. .. because of such individual's race, color ... " (emphasis added)); 29 U.S.C. § 
623(a)(I) (2006) ("It shaH be unlawful for an employer to ... discriminate against any individual ... because of 
such individual's age .... " (emphasis added)). 
21 490 u.s. 228 (1989). 
22 /d. at 232. 
23 /d. at 239-40 (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e--2(a)(I),(2) (1988)). 
24 !d. at 239. 
25 /d. at 240. 
26 /d. at 24 I. 
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factor of an adverse employment decision. The plaintiff does not have to prove that this factor 
was a "but-for" cause of the employment decision.27 
Justice Brennan, however, also acknowledged that Congress did not mean to strip an 
employer of its freedom of choice when it enacted Title VII. 28 In order to ensure that employers 
could maintain some discretion in making their business decisions, Justice Brennan concluded 
that the statute grants an affirmative defense to employers by which they could avoid liability 
completely. In order to prevail through this "same decision" affirmative defense, the employer 
would have to prove that it would have made the same adverse decision, even if it did not 
consider an impermissible factor such as race, sex, etc. 29 Thus, the typical Title VII mixed-
motive case would proceed as follows: I) Plaintiff must prove that Defendant employer made an 
adverse employment decision against him based, at least in part, on an impermissible factor such 
as race, sex, etc.; 2) If Plaintiff makes such a showing, then the employer will be liable unless it 
can prove its affirmative defense; 3) In order to establish the affirmative defense, the employer 
must bear the burden of persuasion that, even if the impermissible factor was not considered 
when making the adverse decision, the employer would still have made the same decision 
anyway based on other legitimate factors. Specifically, the employer must establish that the 
impermissible factor was not the "but-for" cause of the employment decision.30 
In a separate concurring opinion, Justice 0' Connor expressly disagreed with the 
plurality's holding that the phrase "because of' indicates a mixed-motive standard of causation.31 
According to Justice O'Connor, the phrase "because of' necessarily requires but-for causation.32 
27 Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 241-42. 
28 /d. at 242. 
29 /d. at 244-45. 
30 /d. at 244-46. 
31 Jd at 262 (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
32 /d. 
7 
For Justice O'Connor, the framework established by the plurality was the correct one, but she 
argued that it was best viewed as a burden-shifting framework in which the burden shifted from 
the plaintiff to the defendant to prove or disprove but-for causation, rather than a mixed-motive 
standard subject to an affirmative defense.33 Justice O'Connor supported her conclusion through 
an analogy to multiple causation cases in tort law, as well as the legislative history and policies 
of Title VII.34 Accordingly, Justice O'Connor agreed with the plurality that the burden should be 
on the defendant to prove that the impermissible factor was not the "but-for" cause of the adverse 
employment decision.35 But she fundamentally disagreed that the phrase "because of' indicated 
a mixed-motive standard of causation. 36 
Finally, Justice Kennedy's dissenting opinion argued for yet another definition of the 
phrase "because of." According to Justice Kennedy, the phrase "because of' requires but-for 
causation, but it is the plaintiff who bears the burden of proving it. 37 
Thus, there were three different interpretations of the phrase "because of' as related to 
Title VII.38 But even though there was no general consensus as to the meaning of "because of," 
a majority of the Justices (the plurality plus Justice O'Connor and Justice White) agreed that, in a 
33 Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 276 (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
34 !d. at 263, 265 (O'Connor, J., concurring); see also infra Part IV.B. 
35 Id at 275-76 (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
36 Id One other aspect of Justice O'Connor's concurrence also bears mentioning. According to Justice O'Connor, a 
plaintiff must use direct evidence to establish that his employer considered an impermissible factor in making an 
adverse employment decision. !d. at 276 (O'Connor, J., concurring). This aspect of Justice O'Connor's opinion, 
however, while relevant and significant in adjudicating ADA cases, is beyond the scope of this Comment. 
37 Jd at 281-83,286 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
38 Justice White wrote a short concurring opinion as well in which he agreed with the framework established by the 
plurality based solely on analogous prior precedent. According to Justice White, there was no need to determine 
whether the framework should be categorized as a burden-shifting regime or a mixed-motive standard subject to an 
affirmative defense. Prior precedent already clearly established that a plaintiff need only prove that an illegitimate 
factor was a motivating factor in an adverse employment decision. !d. at 258--60 (White, J., concurring). Justice 
White disagreed with the plurality, however, with respect to the type of evidence that an employer must provide 
when asserting its "same decision defense," but this goes beyond the scope of this Comment. !d. at 261 (White, J., 
concurring). 
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Title VII case, a plaintiff is not responsible for provmg but-for causation.39 He is only 
responsible for proving that a factor such as race, sex, etc., was a motivating factor in the 
employer's adverse decision.40 Upon this showing, the employer would bear the burden of 
proving that the impermissible factor was not the "but-for" cause of the adverse decision. 
B. The Civil Rights Act of 1991 and the Development of the Mixed-Motive Standard 
In response to Price Waterhouse, as well as some other Supreme Court cases decided 
around the same time, Congress enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1991 ("1991 CRA"), which 
amended several anti-discrimination statutes including Title VII, the ADA, and the ADEA.41 
Congress cited two reasons for enacting the 1991 CRA: 
The first is to respond to recent Supreme Court decisions by 
restoring the civil rights protections that were dramatically limited 
by those decisions. The second is to strengthen existing 
protections and remedies available under federal civil rights laws 
to provide more effective deterrence and adequate compensation 
for victims of discrimination.42 
Pleased with the expansion of victim protections that Price Waterhouse granted yet 
disturbed about allowing employers to escape liability through an affirmative defense, in cases 
involving both legitimate and illegitimate factors that motivate an adverse employment decision, 
Congress amended Title VII to explicitly allow for a mixed-motive standard of causation.43 This 
amendment codified the holding in Price Waterhouse that discriminating against an employee 
"because of' race, sex, etc., meant that an employer would be liable for merely considering an 
impermissible factor among other legitimate factors when making an employment decision.44 At 
the same time, however, this Section removed the "same decision" affirmative defense 
39 Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 240-42; id. at 276 (O'Connor, J., concurring); id at 258-60 (White, J., 
concurring). 
40 Jd. 
41 Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991) . 
. 
42 H.R. REP. No. 102-40, pt. 2, at I (1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 694, 694. 
43 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2006). 
44 See id. 
9 
established in Price Waterhouse, which was once available to employers.45 This amendment, 
thus, marked the first legislative formulation of the "mixed-motive/motivating-factor standard" 
in which a plaintiff would prevail on his claim if he could prove merely that his employer 
considered an impermissible factor in making an adverse employment decision.46 But-for 
causation would be irrelevant to determining liability.47 
Employers were, however, afforded some modicum of relief from this new plaintiff-
friendly standard. While the 1991 CRA removed but-for causation from the liability inquiry, it 
made but-for causation relevant in the context ofremedies.48 Under Section 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) of 
Title VII (as amended by the 1991 CRA), a plaintiff would be limited in the available relief for 
his claim if his employer could prove that it would have made the same decision without 
consideration of the impermissible factor (i.e., that the impermissible factor was not the "but-for" 
cause ).49 If an employer could make this showing, then the plaintiff would be entitled only to 
injunctive relief, declaratory relief, and attorney's fees and costs.50 This amendment left no 
room for doubt that but-for causation has no place in a Title VII liability inquiry. Standing 
alone, the Price Waterhouse decision and subsequent legislative action would be persuasive 
authority for extending this mixed-motive framework to the ADA, which is a similarly worded 
statute with similar goals-namely the eradication of employment discrimination. As noted in 
the next section, however, the link that Congress created between the ADA and Title VII 
removes any lingering doubt that the mixed-motive framework applies to the ADA. 
45 See id. 
46 See id. 
47 See id. 
48 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-S(g)(2)(B) (2006). 
49 !d. 
50 Jd. 
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C. The Creation of a Link Between the ADA and Title VII, and its Application in the Wake 
of Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs .• Inc. 
When Congress enacted the ADA, it indicated that the ADA should be "interpreted in a 
manner consistent with ... Title VII."51 Accordingly, Congress created the ADA as a "linked 
statute."52 It does not have its own enforcement provisions but rather it shares the enforcement 
provisions of Title VII. 53 Under Section 12117 of the ADA: 
The powers, remedies, and procedures set forth in sections 2000e-
4, 2000e-5, 2000e-6, 2000e-8, and 2000e-9 of [Title VII] shall be 
the powers, remedies, and procedures this subchapter provides to 
the Commission, to the Attorney General, or to any person alleging 
discrimination on the basis of disability in violation of any 
provision of this chapter, or regulations promulgated under section 
12116 of this title, concerning employment. 54 
Thus, this Section explicitly links the "powers, remedies, and procedures" of Title VII to the 
ADA. 55 
Moreover, Congress intended that any future amendments to those enforcement 
provisions of Title VII also apply to the ADA. 56 Accordingly, after the 1991 CRA amended 
Title VII to explicitly grant a full mixed-motive standard of causation, many of the circuit courts 
began to automatically apply a mixed-motive standard of causation to the ADA as well.57 
51 H.R. REP. No. 102-40, pt. 2, at 4 (1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 694, 697. 
52 See Flynn, supra note 19, at 2013. 
53 See id. 
54 42 U.S. C.§ 12117 (2006). 
55 !d. 
56 Lewis v. Humboldt Acquisition Corp., Inc., 681 F.3d 312, 322 (6th Cir. 2012) (Clay, J., dissenting) (looking to an 
ADA House Report, which explicitly stated that future amendments to Title VII were to apply to the ADA as well); 
H.R. REP. No. 102-40, pt. 2, at 4 (1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 694, 697 ("Certain sections of Title VII 
are explicitly cross-referenced in Subsection 107(a) of the ADA, to ensure that persons with disabilities have the 
same powers, remedies and procedures as under Title VII. This would include having the same remedies and statute 
oflimitations as Title VII, as amended by this Act, and by any foture amendment.") (emphasis added); see also 
Flynn, supra note 19, at 2010 n.ll ("Congress links statutes instead of reproducing them, not because it is a paragon 
of efficiency or paper conservation, but because it wishes to ensure that future legislative changes to the original 
statute apply to the statute that references--or is linked to-it."). 
57 See, e.g., Head v. Glacier Nw. Inc., 413 F.3d 1053 (9th Cir. 2005); Parker v. Columbia Pictures Indus., 204 F.3d 
326 (2d Cir. 2000); Foster v. Arthur Andersen, LLP, 168 F.3d 1029 (7th Cir. 1999); Newberry v. E. Texas State 
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Courts, however, began to scrutinize this mixed-motive standard in ADA cases following the 
Supreme Court decision in Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc. 58 
While Gross dealt with a claim under the ADEA,59 it has had far-reaching application in 
the context of the ADA as well.60 In Gross, an employee sued his employer under the ADEA 
alleging that the employer demoted him because of his age.61 It was uncontested that precedent 
in the Eighth Circuit at that time applied the framework established in Price Waterhouse to 
ADEA cases where there was a mix of legitimate and illegitimate factors that motivated an 
adverse employment decision.62 Under that standard, an ADEA plaintiff needed to prove only 
that age was a motivating factor in an employment decision, and the employer would be liable 
unless it could prove its affirmative defense demonstrating that age was not the "but-for" cause 
of the adverse decision. The sole question on certiorari was whether a plaintiff had to prove his 
case through direct evidence in order to be eligible for the Price Waterhouse framework. 63 
The Court, however, held that the Price Waterhouse framework was never available in an 
ADEA case.64 More specifically, the Court found that the ADEA is materially different from 
Title VII, and that Title VII cases like Price Waterhouse do not control an analysis of the 
causation standards applicable to ADEA cases.65 The Court stated that, "[w]hen conducting 
statutory interpretation, [it] 'must be careful not to apply rules applicable under one statute to a 
different statute without careful and critical examination. "'66 The Court also stated that, since its 
Univ., 161 F.3d 276 (5th Cir. 1998); Katz v. City Metal Co., Inc., 87 F.3d 26 (1st Cir. 1996); Pedigo v. P.A.M. 
Transp., Inc., 60 F.3d 1300 (8th Cir. 1995). 
58 557 U.S. 167 (2009). 
59 !d. at 170. 
60 See, e.g., Lewis, 681 F.3d 312; Serwatka v. Rockwell Automation, Inc., 591 F.3d 957 (7th Cir. 2010). 
61 Gross, 557 U.S. at 170. 
62 Id. at 171-72. 
63 !d. at272. 
64 !d. at 169-70. 
65 Id. at 173. 
66 Id. at 174 (quoting Federal Express Corp. v. Holowecki, 552 U.S. 389, 393 (2008)). 
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inception, the framework established in Price Waterhouse has been difficult to apply 
practically.67 The Court did not overturn Price Waterhouse, but it did say that any possible 
benefit of extending the Price Waterhouse framework to ADEA cases was outweighed by its 
problems in application. 68 
For these reasons, the Court did not analyze the ADEA under the Price Waterhouse 
decision or similar Title VII cases. Instead, the Court looked at the plain text of the ADEA in 
rendering its decision.69 First, the Court noted that the ADEA does not have an explicit mixed-
motive provision like Title VII.70 Moreover, the Court noted that both the ADEA and Title VII 
were amended under the 1991 CRA, yet Congress saw fit to add the mixed-motive provision 
only to Title VII. 71 
Ultimately, the Court consulted Webster's dictionary and found that the causational 
language of the ADEA ("because of') was equivalent to the phrase "by reason of."72 Under this 
definition, the Court found that an ADEA plaintiff must demonstrate that age was the "reason" 
for the adverse employment decision, which the Court held to mean but-for causation.73 Thus, 
the Court defined the phrase "because of' in the context of the ADEA as requiring but-for 
• 74 
causatwn. 
Soon after the Court rendered its decision in Gross, the Seventh Circuit applied the Gross 
analysis to claims brought under the ADA.75 As previously noted, the ADA uses the same 
"because of' language that is utilized in Title VII and in the ADEA, which the Court had 
67 Gross, 557 U.S. at 179. 
68 !d. at 179-80. 
69 !d. at 175. 
70 !d. at 174. 
71 !d. 
72 !d. at 176. 
73 Gross, 557 U.S. at 176 
74 !d. 
75 See Serwatka v. Rockwell Automation, Inc., 591 F.3d 957 (7th Cir. 2010). 
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analyzed in Gross. 76 In Serwatka v. Rockwell Automation. Inc., the Seventh Circuit analogized 
the text of the ADA to that of the ADEA.77 It interpreted the decision in Gross as holding that, 
unless there is express language in a statute allowing for a mixed-motive standard, the phrase 
"because of' in a statute means that the plaintiff has to prove "but-for" causation.78 The court 
concluded that, since the ADA had no explicit provision granting a mixed-motive standard, and 
since the ADA text used the phrase "because of," a plaintiff bringing a claim under the ADA was 
not entitled to a mixed-motive standard. 79 Rather, a plaintiff suing under the ADA would be 
required to prove but-for causation. 80 
More recently (in Lewis v. Humboldt Acquisition Corp., Inc.), the Sixth Circuit had the 
opportunity to address this issue.81 In Lewis, the court held that an ADA plaintiff must prove 
but-for causation rather than merely satisfy a mixed-motive standard of causation.82 The court 
began by recapping the history of Title VII, including the Price Waterhouse decision and the 
1991 CRA.83 The court concluded that the Title VII history could be viewed in one of two ways. 
The first is that the Price Waterhouse decision was intended to govern the meaning of "because 
of' in all statutes with similar wording. 84 The second is that, by explicitly amending Title VII to 
grant a mixed-motive standard without doing the same to other similarly worded laws, Congress 
76 See 42 U.S.C. § 12112 (2006) (stating that "[n]o covered entity shall discriminate against a qualified individual 
with a disability because of the disability of such individual ... ") (emphasis added). 
77 Serwatka, 59! F.3d at 961~2. 
78 /d. at 962. 
79 !d. 
80 !d. 
81 681 F.3d 312 (6th Cir. 2012). 
82 !d. at 317-18. 
83 !d. at 317. 
84 !d. at 318. 
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manifested its intent for the mixed-motive standard to apply only to Title VII. 85 According to the 
majority, Congress clearly adopted the latter interpretation.86 
The majority then analogized the ADA to the ADEA.87 The court noted that neither the 
ADA nor the ADEA has explicit wording granting a mixed-motive standard even though the 
1991 CRA amended both statutes at the same time that it added the mixed-motive language to 
Title VII. 88 Moreover, both statutes use the words "because of' as their standard of causation. 89 
The court also rejected arguments based on legislative history and legislative intent, holding that 
such appeals were ineffective in Gross and were ineffective here as well. 90 
Finally, the court rejected an argument that the shared powers, remedies, and procedures 
of Title VII and the ADA through the statutory link entitled ADA plaintiffs to a mixed-motive 
standard.91 Ultimately then, the majority found the ADA context indistinguishable from the 
ADEA, which was analyzed in Gross. For many of the same reasons advanced in Gross, the 
court found that ADA plaintiffs are not entitled to a mixed-motive standard, and must instead 
prove but-for causation.92 
In separate dissenting opmwns, judges Clay, Stranch, and Donald expressed their 
disapproval of the holding reached by the majority, and explained why the language of the ADA 
actually supports a motivating factor standard of causation rather than a but-for causation 
standard.93 Judge Clay and Judge Donald argued that the statutory link between the ADA and 
85 /d. 
86 /d. 
87 Lewis, 681 F.3dat318. 
88 /d. 
89 /d. 
90 /d. at 320. 
91 !d. at319-20. 
92 /d. at 321. 
93 See Lewis, 681 F.3d at 322-25 (Clay, J., dissenting); id. at 325-31 (Stranch, J., dissenting); id. at 331-42 (Donald, 
J., dissenting). 
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Title VII was dispositive on the issue. 94 Since the link incorporates the "powers, remedies, and 
procedures" of Title VII into the ADA, the dissenters argued that the motivating factor standard 
of Title VII applied to the ADA as wel1.95 Moreover, Judge Stranch and Judge Donald put great 
emphasis on the historical context of the ADA beginning with Price Waterhouse, and concluding 
with the codification of the meaning of the phrase "because of' through the 1991 CRA and the 
subsequent implementation of the ADA.96 The historical context demonstrated that, at the time 
of the enactment of the ADA, the phrase "because of' was being interpreted as granting a 
motivating factor standard of causation.97 Judge Stranch also relied on legislative history, 
including House Reports, for the assertion that Congress intended to grant ADA plaintiffs a 
motivating factor standard of causation.98 
III. Plaintiffs Bringing a Claim Under the ADA are Entitled to the Same Mixed-Motive 
Instruction and Remedies as Title VII Plaintiffs 
The arguments advanced by the majority in Lewis and Serwatka are fatally flawed. Both 
cases looked to the express language in the ADA that resembled that of the ADEA without 
giving sufficient attention to the historical differences between the two statutes. When put in the 
appropriate historical context, both the language and legislative history of the ADA demonstrate 
that the phrase "because of' as applied to the ADA was intended to grant ADA plaintiffs the 
ability to assert a claim under a mixed-motive standard of causation. 
94 See id. at 322-23 (Clay, J., dissenting); id. at 340-41 (Donald, J., dissenting). 
95 !d. 
96 See id. at 326-27 (Stranch, J., dissenting); id. at 332-33 (Donald, J., dissenting). 
97 See id. 
98 !d. at 329-31 (Stranch, J., dissenting); see discussion infra Parts III and IV for a deeper analysis of the dissenting 
opinions in Lewis as well as an expansion oftheir arguments. 
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A. The Statutory Link Between the ADA and Title VII Expressly Grants ADA Plaintiffs the 
Same Mixed-Motive Standard of Causation as Title VII Plaintiffs 
As noted above, Congress linked the enforcement provisions of the ADA to those of Title 
VII through Section 12117.99 Under this Section, the ADA is to have the same "powers, 
remedies, and procedures" that are listed in Sections 2000e-4, -5, -6, -8, -9 of Title VII. 100 The 
plain language of Section 12117 indicates that any amendments made to the "powers, remedies, 
and procedures" of Title VII will apply to the ADA as wel!. 101 
One such amendment was made to Title VII Section 2000e-5 under the 1991 CRA in 
response to the decision in Price Waterhouse. 102 This Section states that: 
On a claim in which an individual proves a violation under section 
2000e-2(m) of this title and a respondent demonstrates that the 
respondent would have taken the same action in the absence of the 
impermissible motivating factor, the court--
(i) may grant declaratory relief, injunctive relief (except as 
provided in clause (ii)), and attorney's fees and costs demonstrated 
to be directly attributable only to the pursuit of a claim under 
section 2000e-2(m) of this title; and 
(ii) shall not award damages or issue an order requiring any 
admission, reinstatement, hiring, promotion, or payment, described 
in subparagraph (A). 103 
This Section is one of two essential amendments made to Title VII through the 1991 CRA. First, 
Section 2000e-2(m) establishes liability under the newly codified mixed-motive standard, 104 and 
99 42 U.S.C. § 12117 (2006). 
100 !d. 
101 As discussed supra Part II. C., Section 12117 states that "[t]he powers, remedies, and procedures set forth in 
sections 2000e-4, 2000e-5, 2000e-6, 2000e-8, and 2000e-9 of [Title VII] shall be the powers, remedies, and 
procedures [of the ADA]." 42 U.S.C. § 12117 (2006) (emphasis added). Since the amended versions of those 
enumerated sections contain "powers, remedies, and procedures set forth in [those] sections," they will accordingly 
apply to the ADA. See 42 U.S.C. 2000e-4, -5, -6, -8, -9 (2006); 42 U.S.C. § 12117 (2006). Moreover, even if there 
is any ambiguity in the language of§ 12117 with regard to whether or not it applies to amendments to Title VII, the 
legislative history of that Section clearly demonstrates that Congress intended for such amendments to apply to the 
ADA. See Lewis v. Humboldt Acquisition Corp., Inc., 681 F.3d 312, 322 (6th Cir. 2012) (Clay, J., dissenting); H.R. 
REP. No. 102-40, pt. 2, at 4 (1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 694, 697; see also Flynn, supra note 19, at 2010 
n.ll. 
102 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) (2006). 
103 !d. 
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second, Section 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) limits the remedies available to the plaintiff upon establishing 
liability, if the employer is able to prove that the plaintiffs disability was not the "but-for" cause 
of the employer's adverse decision. 105 Since amendments to Title VII's enforcement provisions 
apply to the ADA as well, 106 it is uncontested that the newly amended Section 2000e-5 would 
apply to the ADA. The problem, however, is that the section establishing liability (Section 
2000e-2(m)) is not one of the enforcement provisions that expressly applies to the ADA through 
the statutory link.107 Essentially, the statutory language seems to create a remedy for the ADA108 
with no express method for establishing the requisite liability for obtaining that remedy. The 
question, then, is whether an ADA plaintiff is entitled to the Title VII mixed-motive framework 
under Section 2000e-2(m) through incorporation by Section 2000e-5(g)(2)(B), notwithstanding 
the fact that Section 2000e-2(m) itself is not expressly incorporated into the ADA. 
Under any sensible reading of these statutes, 109 Section 2000e-2(m), the mixed-motive 
liability section of Title VII, must be incorporated into the ADA. While Section 2000e-2(m) is 
not directly incorporated into the ADA through the enforcement provisions link, it is still 
incorporated into the ADA through Section 2000e-5(g)(2)(B). A reference to Section 2000e-
2(m) is explicitly made in Section 2000e-5(g)(2)(B). 110 A plaintiff will be entitled to the 2000e-
5(g)(2)(B) remedies upon a demonstration that 2000e-2(m) has been violated, and upon the 
104 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2006) ("[A]n unlawful employment practice is established when the complaining 
party demonstrates that race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating factor for any employment 
p,ractice, even though other factors also motivated the practice.") (emphasis added). 
05 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) (2006). 
106 See supra note 101 and accompanying text. 
107 See 42 U.S.C. § 12117 (2006). 
108 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) (2006). 
109 42 U.S.C. § 12117 (2006); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) (2006); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2006). 
"
0 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) (2006) ("On a claim in which an individual proves a violation under section 
2000e-2(m) of this title and a respondent demonstrates that the respondent would have taken the same action in the 
absence of the impermissible motivating factor .... "). 
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employer's showing that there was no but-for causation. Ill There is essentially a double link 
here: Section 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) is linked to the ADA through the enforcement provision of ADA 
Section 12117. That section then references Section 2000e-2(m), thereby incorporating those 
standards into the ADA. The most logical reading of these provisions is that Section 2000e-
5(g)(2)(B), which is explicitly linked to the ADA, grants an ADA plaintiff limited relief upon a 
showing that an impermissible factor (i.e., disability) played a role in an adverse employment 
decision, and after the employer proves that the impermissible factor was not the "but-for" cause 
of the decision. 
This reading of the interplay between the Title VII mixed-motive provisions and the 
ADA based on the enforcement link has been questioned by some courts. 112 These courts have 
posited arguments against the above analysis, though none of these arguments proves to be very 
convincing. 113 One such argument was advanced by the Seventh Circuit in Serwatka/ 14 which 
noted that the statutory link between Title VII and the ADA links only powers, remedies, and 
procedures. 115 According to the court, Section 2000e-2(m) is none of these. Rather it is a 
standard of liability, which is not a category that is linked to the ADA under Section 12117.116 
Accordingly, the court held that Section 2000e-2(m) was inapplicable to the ADA, and that 
plaintiffs suing under the ADA were, therefore, not entitled to a mixed-motive standard.117 
While it is true that Section 12117 links only "powers, remedies, and procedures," the 
argument raised by Serwatka is untenable because it fails to recognize that a remedy without a 
mechanism for producing liability would be meaningless. If Section 2000e-2(m) was not 
Ill /d. 
112 See, e.g., Lewis v. Humboldt Acquisition Corp., Inc., 681 F.3d 312, 319-20 (6th Cir. 2012); Serwatka v. 
Rockwell Automation, Inc., 591 F.3d 957, 962 (7th Cir. 2010). 
113 See, e.g., id. 
114 See supra Part II.D. 
115 Serwatka, 591 F.3d at 962. 
116 /d. 
117 /d. 
19 
intended to apply to the ADA, then there would have been no need to link the ADA to Section 
2000e-5(g)(2)(B) with no means of obtaining the remedy provided therein. As the Supreme 
Court has repeatedly held, cannons of statutory interpretation require that a provision of a statute 
be read in a manner that does not render other provisions of that statute superfluous. 118 
Furthermore, one may characterize the mixed-motive framework established m part 
through Section 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) as a "power."119 Webster's dictionary defines the term 
"power" as the "ability to act or produce an effect."120 Looking at Section 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) 
then, that Section gives an ADA plaintiff the "ability to produce [the] effect" of getting specific 
remedies by demonstrating that his employer considered the plaintiff's disability in making an 
employment decision. 121 This indicates that the mixed-motive standard applies to the ADA. 
Another argument that has been raised in opposition to the conclusion that Section 
2000e-2(m) is incorporated into the ADA is that, in order to get a remedy under Section 2000e-
5(g)(2)(B), by its terms, one must first establish a violation of Section 2000e-(2)(m).122 This 
would (as the argument suggests) include proving that "race, color, religion, sex, or national 
origin was a motivating-factor for any employment practice .... "123 Thus, if an ADA plaintiff 
wanted to get a mixed- motive standard under the ADA, he would have to prove discrimination 
based on Title VII factors such as race, sex, etc., rather than on disability. 
118 See, e.g., Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3228 (2010) (recognizing a "canon against interpreting any statutory 
provision in a manner that would render another provision superfluous"); Hibbs v. Winn, 542 U.S. 88, 89 (2004) 
("[T]he rule against superfluities instructs courts to interpret a statute to effectuate all its provisions, so that no part 
is rendered superfluous."); Dole Food Co. v. Patrickson, 538 U.S. 468,476-77 (2003) ("Absent a statutory text or 
structure that requires us to depart from normal rules of construction, we should not construe [a] statute in a manner 
that is strained and, at the same time, would render a statutory term superfluous."). 
119 Seam Park, Curing Causation: JustifYing a "Motivating-Factor" Standard Under the ADA, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. 
REv. 257, 273 (2004). 
120 Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, http://www.merriarn-webster.com/dictionary/power (last visited Mar. 30, 
2013). 
121 See Park, supra note 119, at 273. 
122 Lewis v. Humboldt Acquisition Corp., Inc., 681 F.3d 312, 319-20 (6th Cir. 2012). 
123 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2006) (emphasis added). 
20 
As with the first proposed argwnent mentioned above, this argwnent fails because it 
would render the link between Section 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) and the ADA meaningless. The 
argument can be read in one of two ways. The first is that Section 2000e-(2)(m) never applies to 
ADA claims. Under that reading, Section 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) would provide a remedy with no 
mechanism for obtaining it, which would make the link worthless. The second way that the 
argwnent could be interpreted is that a plaintiff can sue under the ADA for race, sex, or other 
discrimination. This reading is equally implausible when one considers the fact that the 
governing purpose of the ADA is to eradicate discrimination against disabled individuals, 124 as 
well as the fact that there is already a statutory mechanism available for claims of discrimination 
on the basis of race, sex, and other discrimination-Title VII. The only logical reading of these 
provisions in light of the statutory link is that the mixed-motive standard set forth in those 
provisions is applicable to the ADA. 125 
B. The Historical Context of the ADA Also Suggests that the Phrase "Because of' in the ADA 
Requires a Mixed-Motive Standard 
Aside from the explicit statutory link granting an ADA plaintiff the same mixed-motive 
standard as a Title VII plaintiff, the phrase "because of' as applied to the ADA also suggests a 
mixed-motive standard of causation. The historical context behind the ADA holds the key to 
determining what Congress intended the phrase "because of' to mean with regard to the ADA. 
As a preliminary matter, it should first be noted that a blanket application of Gross's 
holding that "because of' means "but-for" causation would be wholly inappropriate. In Gross, 
the Court sought to define the phrase "because of' with regard to the ADEA. The Court ended 
124 See 42 U.S.C. § 1210 I (2006). 
125 See, e.g., Lewis 681 F.3d at 340 (Donald, J., dissenting) (noting that by linking§ 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) to the ADA, 
Congress intended for those remedies to be available to ADA plaintiffs, and the remedies only apply in the mixed-
motive context). 
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up consulting the dictionary, and ultimately concluded that the phrase "because of" in the ADEA 
required a finding of but-for causation. 126 
This holding, however, should not be read to be a blanket assertion that "because of' 
always means but-for causation. First, as the Court itself notes, "[w]hen conducting statutory 
interpretation, we 'must be careful not to apply rules applicable under one statute to a different 
statute without careful and critical examination. "'127 Gross was a decision based on an ADEA 
case, not an ADA case. A strict application of the holding in Gross to a claim under the ADA 
would, thus, be contradictory to the Court's assertion that different statutes should be analyzed 
separately. Second, the phrase "because of' cannot always mean but-for causation because Title 
VII still uses the words "because of'128 as its causational language, yet Title VII cases are 
analyzed under a mixed-motive standard based on the amended provisions that were added to 
Title VII. If Gross is read as holding that "because of' always means but-for causation, then 
Title VII would have conflicting causation standards. A more logical reading of Gross is that the 
Court only determined that "because of' means but-for causation in the ADEA context. 
Since the holding of Gross was, thus, limited to the ADEA, a closer look at the ADA is 
required in order to determine the meaning of the phrase "because of' as applied to the ADA. In 
the ADA context, this phrase should be viewed similarly to Title VII based on the history 
surrounding the enactment of the ADA, beginning with Price Waterhouse. As noted above, the 
Court in Price Waterhouse interpreted the phrase "because of' in Title VII as allowing a plaintiff 
to prevail on his Title VII claim if he could prove simply that his employer's adverse action was 
126 Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 176 (2009). 
127 /d. at 174 (quoting Federal Express Corp. v. Holowecki, 552 U.S. 389, 393 (2008)). 
128 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a){l) (2006) ("It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer ... to 
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of 
employment, because of such individual's race, color .... ") (emphasis added). 
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based, at least in part, on impermissible factors such as race, sex, etc.129 The employer would 
then be given the opportunity to avoid liability by establishing a "same decision" affirmative 
defense.13° Congress then codified this holding in Title VII while stripping the employer of any 
affirmative defense, thus, effectively establishing a complete mixed-motive standard. 131 Before 
codifying this holding, however, Congress enacted the ADA with the same "because of'' 
language, 132 and linked the enforcement provisions of Title VII to it.133 After linking the 
statutes, Congress then amended Title VII to explicitly include the new motivating-factor 
standard, 134 yet it did not change the "because of'' language that was present in the text of Title 
Piecing all of this together, it appears that Congress intentionally kept the phrase 
"because of'' in Title VII along with the mixed-motive standard to convey that it intended the 
phrase "because of'' to mean that a plaintiff would be entitled to a mixed-motive standard. 
Several of these historical facts lead to the conclusion that Congress intended for the "because 
of'' language in the ADA to have the same mixed-motive application as Title VII: The ADA was 
adopted in very close proximity to both Price Waterhouse and the 1991 CRA; 136 Congress 
linked Title VII and the ADA together to ensure that the 1991 CRA amendments would apply to 
the ADA;137 and Congress kept the "because of'' language of Title VII intact to insure that 
129 Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228,240-41 (1989). 
130 !d. at 244-45. 
131 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2006); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) (2006). 
132 See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (2006). 
133 See 42 U.S.C. § 12117 (2006). 
134 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2006); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) (2006). 
135 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l) (2006). 
136 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1990); Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991); 
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989). 
137 Lewis v. Humboldt Acquisition Corp., Inc., 681 F.3d 312, 322 (6th Cir. 2012) (Clay, J., dissenting) (looking to 
an ADA House Report, which explicitly stated that future amendments to Title VII were to apply to the ADA as 
well); H.R. REP. No. 102-40, pt. 2, at 4 (1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 694, 697 ("Certain sections of Title 
VII are explicitly cross-referenced in Subsection 107(a) of the ADA, to ensure that persons with disabilities have the 
same powers, remedies and procedures as under Title VII. This would include having the same remedies and statute 
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"because of' would be defined as requiring a mixed-motive standard. 138 When put in context, 
then, it is clear that when Congress enacted the ADA, it meant for the "because of' language to 
grant a mixed- motive standard. 
C. Legislative History of the ADA Supporting a Mixed-Motive Standard for the ADA 
As noted above, the plain language ofthe ADA, including its statutory link to Title VII as 
well as the historical context in which the ADA was enacted, clearly demonstrates that an ADA 
plaintiff is entitled to a mixed-motive standard of causation. Even if the language of the ADA is 
construed as ambiguous, however, the legislative history of the ADA supports the plain language 
reading posited above. 139 
An ADA House Report stated: 
An amendment was offered . . . that would have removed the 
cross-reference to Title VII and would have substituted the actual 
words of the cross-referenced sections. This amendment was an 
attempt to freeze the current Title VII remedies (i.e., equitable 
relief, including injunctions and back pay) in the ADA. This 
amendment was rejected as antithetical to the purpose of the 
ADA-to provide civil rights protections for persons with 
disabilities that are parallel to those available to minorities and 
women. By retaining the cross-reference to Title VII, the 
Committee's intent is that the remedies of Title VII, currently and 
oflimitations as Title VII, as amended by this Act, and by any future amendment.") (emphasis added); see also 
Flynn, supra note 19, at 2010 n.ll ("Congress links statutes instead of reproducing them, not because it is a paragon 
of efficiency or paper conservation, but because it wishes to ensure that future legislative changes to the original 
statute apply to the statute that references-or is linked to----it."). 
138 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l) (2006). 
139 Under principles of statutory construction, a court will not consider legislative history when interpreting a statute 
if the text of the statute is clear on its face. Hughes Aircraft Co. v. Jacobson, 525 U.S. 432,438 (1999). Thus, if it 
were determined that the phrase "because of' is clear, then a court would not look to legislative history to determine 
what Congress intended the phrase to mean. Moreover, as the above analysis suggests, the plain language at issue 
supports a mixed-motive standard of causation. But a plausible argument may be made that the language is not 
actually clear, but rather that it is ambiguous. Support for this argument may be demonstrated by the fact that in 
Price Waterhouse, there were three proposed defmitions for the phrase "because of." Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 
490 U.S. 228 (1989). Moreover, the phrase "because of' has been defined by the courts as describing a but-for 
causation standard for the ADEA, but at the same time, describing a mixed-motive standard for Title VII. See supra 
Part IIJ.B. Based on these competing defmitions of the phrase "because of," the argument may be raised that the 
phrase is ambiguous, and that more is needed in identifYing its significance in the context of the ADA than simply 
consulting a dictionary. Legislative history may, thus, be helpful in identifYing Congressional intent, which may 
shed light on what Congress intended the phrase to mean in the context of the ADA. 
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as amended in the future, will be applicable to persons with 
disabilities. 140 
According to this report, Congress rejected a proposed amendment that would have removed the 
statutory link between the ADA and Title VII.141 Its reason for doing so was that it was contrary 
to the policies of the ADA-namely that disabled citizens should have "protections" that are 
"parallel" to Title VII victims. 142 The key word in this Report is "protections."143 This word is 
quite broad and demonstrates Congress's intent for the ADA framework to be analogous to that 
of Title VII. An ADA plaintiff is not afforded the same "protections" as a Title VII plaintiff 
when he is required to get over the hurdle of but-for causation. 
Another ADA House Report speaking about the upcoming 1991 CRA stated that, "'[a] 
bill is currently pending' that 'would amend the powers, remedies and procedures of title VII. ... 
Because of the cross-reference to title VII in [the ADA], any amendments to title VII that may be 
made in [that bill] ... would be fully applicable to the ADA. "'144 This Report demonstrates that 
Congress was aware of the pending 1991 CRA legislation when it enacted the ADA. Based on 
the Report, it is apparent that Congress knew about the amendments that were being made to 
Title VII, and it fully intended for them to be applicable to the ADA. According to Judge 
Stranch of the Sixth Circuit, Congress decided to link Title VII to the ADA rather than amend 
both statutes as a matter of practicality due to timing issues. 145 In linking the statutes though, 
Congress "insured that they would proceed in tandem across time."146 Given this history, it is 
140 H.R. REP. No. 101-485, pt. 3, at 48 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 445,471 (emphasis added). 
141 !d. 
142 !d. 
143 !d. 
144 Lewis v. Humboldt Acquisition Corp., Inc., 681 F.3d 312, 320 (6th Cir. 2012) (quoting H.R. REP. No. 101-485, 
y,t. 3, at 48 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 445, 471.). 
45 !d. at 326 (Stranch, J., dissenting). 
146 !d. 
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clear that Congress intended for the ADA and Title VII to share the same standards. This would 
undoubtedly include the mixed-motive standard codified in Title VII. 
D. Legislative History of the 1991 CRA Supporting a Mixed-Motive Standard for the ADA 
The legislative history of the 1991 CRA is even more persuasive on the issue than the 
legislative history of the ADA. 147 In a House Report for the 1991 CRA, the Legislature 
explicitly stated that "mixed-motive cases involving disability under the ADA should be 
interpreted consistent with the prohibition against all intentional discrimination in Section 5 of 
this Act."148 The Report then went on to state in Section 5 that the framework established in 
Price Waterhouse was still too restrictive on plaintiffs, and that the Price Waterhouse decision 
should be discarded in favor of a standard that holds employers liable for discrimination that is a 
"contributing factor" rather than a "but-for" cause.149 Thus, this Report explicitly singled out 
ADA cases involving a mix of legitimate and illegitimate motives, and said that the section in the 
Report abolishing the Price Waterhouse framework in favor of the Title VII mixed-motive 
standard should apply to the ADA. 
The majority in Lewis tried to minimize the effects of this Report, but its attempts to do 
so were contrived at best. First, the court said that Section 5 only applied to Title VII. 150 This 
conclusion is contrary to the express language in the Report. According to the Report, "mixed-
motive cases involving disability under the ADA should be interpreted consistent with the 
prohibition against all intentional discrimination in Section 5 of this Act."151 To say, then, that 
Section 5 does not apply to the ADA when the ADA is explicitly referenced is simply inaccurate. 
147 It bears reiterating that the thrust of the argument of this Comment stems from a plain language reading of the 
ADA. The legislative history described infra is merely used to support the above plain language interpretation 
should the argument be made that the language of the ADA is ambiguous. See supra note 139. 
148 H.R. REP. No. 102-40, pt. 2 at 4 (1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 694, 697. 
149 Id. at 18. 
150 Lewis, 681 F.3d at 320. 
151 H.R. REP. No. 102-40, pt. 2 at 4 (1991). 
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There would be no point in referencing the ADA and Section 5 if that Section was inapplicable 
to the ADA. 
Next, the court stated that the Report referenced the ADA and the ADEA, and that since 
Gross did not find the Report persuasive with regard to the ADEA, it should not be persuasive 
with regard to the ADA either. 152 This bald statement, however, merely concludes that the 
Report is irrelevant without giving sufficient credit to the fact that the Report carries more 
weight with regard to the ADA than the ADEA. While the ADEA is mentioned in the Report as 
the court noted, it is not mentioned in the same context as the ADA. 153 Nowhere in the Report 
does it say, either explicitly or implicitly, that Section 5 should apply to the ADEA, nor does it 
even mention a mixed-motive framework with regard to the AD EA. With the ADA, on the other 
hand, the Report made explicit reference to mixed-motives cases and it linked the ADA to 
Section 5. 154 Therefore, the ADA and ADEA are not analogous in their legislative history or 
historical context. While the ADA has been linked to Title VII, which explicitly provides for a 
mixed-motive standard, and while the ADA has been mentioned explicitly in House Reports 
indicating the intent for the mixed-motive standard to apply to the ADA, the ADEA lacks the 
same clear demonstration of intent to apply the mixed-motive standard. For these reasons, the 
phrase "because of' in the ADA should be considered separately from Gross's definition of the 
phrase with regard to the ADEA, and it is clear that where the ADA is concerned, the phrase 
"because of' was intended to require a mixed-motive standard. 
IV. Alternative Theory Under the Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins Burden-Shifting Standard 
Even if one rejects the notion that the 1991 CRA amendments to Title VII apply to the 
ADA, the causation requirement of the ADA should still, at the very least, be interpreted in line 
152 Lewis, 681 F.3d at 321. 
153 See H.R. REP. No. 102-40, pt. 2 at 4 (1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 694,697. 
154 /d. 
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with the framework laid out in Price Waterhouse. Thus, even if an ADA plaintiff would not be 
able to take advantage of the specific Title VII mixed-motive standard that the 1991 CRA 
provides, he should still be entitled to the mixed-motive standard established in Price 
Waterhouse, subject to a "same decision" affirmative defense. This conclusion is compelled by 
the historical context in which the ADA was enacted and the underlying policies that motivated 
the Price Waterhouse decision. 
A. The Historical Context of the ADA Compels, at a Minimum, a Causational Framework in 
Line with Price Waterhouse 
In order to understand what the words "because of' mean with respect to the ADA, one 
must view the ADA in its historical context. 155 The ADA was adopted in 1990156--only one 
year after Price Waterhouse, and one year before the 1991 CRA. 157 In Price Waterhouse, the 
Supreme Court took painstaking measures to determine the appropriate standard of causation 
under Title VII based on its causational language, "because of."158 Ultimately, the Court 
concluded that the language should be construed as allowing plaintiffs to assert a mixed-motive 
standard, subject to a "same decision" affirmative defense by the employer. 159 Based on 
principles of statutory construction, it is presumed that Congress is aware of the governing law 
when it enacts a new statute. 160 Thus, Congress must have been well aware of the Price 
Waterhouse decision when it enacted the ADA, and must have known that Price Waterhouse 
construed the "because of' language in Title VII to allow a mixed-motive standard, subject to a 
"same decision" affirmative defense. Based on this information, Congress then expressly chose 
155 /d. at 326 (Stranch, J., dissenting). 
156 42 u.s.c. §§ 12101-12213 (2006). 
157 See Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991); Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins. 490 
u.s. 228 (1989). 
158 Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. 228. 
159 !d. at 244-'16. 
160 Lewis, 681 F.3d at 326 (Stranch, J., dissenting); see also Davis v. Mich. Dep't of Treasury, 489 U.S. 803, 813 
(1989) ("Wben Congress codifies a judicially defined concept, it is presumed, absent an express statement to the 
contrary, that Congress intended to adopt the interpretation placed on that concept by the courts."). 
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to use the same "because of' language at issue in Price Waterhouse when drafting the ADA/61 
and it also added Section 12117 to the ADA linking the enforcement provisions of the ADA to 
Title VII. 162 This ensured that the Price Waterhouse definition of "because of' would be 
controlling with respect to the ADA.163 This history demonstrates that the "because of' language 
used in the ADA was intended to apply a mixed-motive standard in line with the Court's 
conclusion in Price Waterhouse. 164 
B. Policy Considerations Weighing in Favor of Applying the Price Waterhouse Framework to 
ADA Claims 
Different policy considerations also weigh in favor of allowing ADA plaintiffs to avoid 
having to prove but-for causation in cases involving mixed motives. In Price Waterhouse, 
Justice O'Connor asserted two justifications in her concurring opinion in support of allowing a 
Title VII plaintiff to shift the burden of proving actual causation to the defendant in a case 
involving mixed motives.165 First, tort law has long held that, in cases involving multiple causes, 
the burden of proof shifts to the defendant to show that its actions were not the "but-for" cause of 
the injury. 166 From a policy standpoint, this seems fair: Proving but-for causation of a specific 
action is a very demanding task when there are several actions that could have actually caused an 
injury. When one of those actions is an unlawful act taken by a defendant, it would seem unduly 
harsh to place this exacting demand on an innocent victim rather than the party whose bad 
161 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (2006). 
162 42 u.s.c. § 12117 (2006). 
163 See Lewis, 681 F.3d at 326--27 (Stranch, J., dissenting) (noting that "when Congress enacted the ADA shortly 
[after Price Waterhouse] and chose both to include the 'because of' language and to cross-reference Title VII, it 
knew that using the Title VII language in an analogous and closely related employment anti-discrimination statute 
created a 'motivating factor' standard"). 
164 Moreover, some recent precedent also supports the contention that plaintiffs suing under the ADA are entitled to 
the Price Waterhouse mixed-motive standard. See, e.g., Smith v. Xerox Corp., 602 F.3d 320 (5th Cir. 2010) 
(declining to apply Gross to Title VII retaliation cases that use the same "because of' language, even though there is 
no express provision granting a mixed-motive standard in such cases). Just as the court in Smith distinguished the 
ADEA from Title VII and refused to apply Gross to Title VII retaliation cases, so too is the ADA sufficiently 
distinguishable from the ADEA to warrant a departure from Gross. 
165 See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 263, 265 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring) 
166 !d. at 263 (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
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conduct was a possible cause of the victim's injury. As a second justification, Justice O'Connor 
looked to the legislative history of Title VII and concluded that Congress believed that reliance 
on things like race or gender was an evil in itself.167 
These considerations apply with equal force to the ADA. In the context of the ADA, it is 
an exceedingly difficult task to prove that one factor such as disability was the actual "but-for" 
cause of an employment decision when an employer is able to cite other legitimate factors 
considered in making its decision. It seems unreasonable as a matter of public policy to burden 
the plaintiff with providing such proof. When the plaintiff is able to prove that the employer 
considered an impermissible factor such as disability in making an employment decision, it 
would be harsh to put this exacting burden on the innocent victim. Rather the burden should fall 
on the employer who has been found to have discriminated against the employee by taking the 
employee's disability into consideration when making an adverse employment decision. 
Furthermore, just as Congress believed considerations of race and gender to be an evil in itself, it 
seems equally clear that Congress had the same view of impermissible considerations of 
disability.168 
C. The Price Waterhouse Framework can Still Apply Even if the Phrase "Because of' is Defined 
as Requiring but-for Causation 
Another important point to take into consideration with regard to this analysis is that, in 
practicality, the thrust of the Price Waterhouse decision deals more with the question of who 
should bear the burden of proving causation than it does with the question of what "because of' 
literally means. While the plaintiff bears the initial burden of proving that an impermissible 
factor was taken into consideration when an adverse employment decision was made, the burden 
then shifts to the employer to prove that this consideration was not the "but-for" cause of the 
167 Id at 265 (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
168 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(8) (2006). 
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decision. Thus, even if it was concluded that "because of' does in fact mean "but-for" causation, 
that would not be enough on its own to prevent a plaintiff from being entitled to the Price 
Waterhouse mixed-motive framework. Under the Price Waterhouse framework, an ultimate 
determination of liability will still turn on whether or not consideration of an impermissible 
factor was the "but-for" cause of the adverse employment decision.169 It is simply a question of 
who must bear that burden-the plaintiff or the defendant. 170 
D. Considerations of the Effect of Gross on the Price Waterhouse Framework 
The best argument that can be made for the conclusion that an ADA plaintiff is not 
entitled to the Price Waterhouse mixed-motive standard is that the Court in Gross seems to have 
significant concerns regarding the underpinnings of the Price Waterhouse framework. 171 In 
Gross, the Supreme Court substantially limited the effects of Price Waterhouse by concluding 
that the application of its framework has led to practical problems in administration.172 While 
the Court did not overturn Price Waterhouse outright, it held that any benefit there may be in 
extending the Price Waterhouse framework to the ADEA was outweighed by the problems that 
the framework has caused. 173 Based on the Supreme Court's serious questioning of the Price 
Waterhouse framework in Gross, the Court might be reluctant to extend this framework to the 
ADA. 
There are, however, even more compelling counter-arguments to this analysis. First, it 
would be contradictory to read the opinion in Gross as completely abandoning the Price 
Waterhouse framework because much of that framework was codified in Title VII through the 
amendments made by the 1991 CRA. In both the Price Waterhouse and the Title VII 
169 See Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 244-46. 
170 See id. 
m Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 179 (2009). 
172 !d. 
173 /d. at 180. 
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frameworks, the employer will bear the burden of proving that its consideration of an 
. . "bl " "b fi " . I d · · 174 ImpermJssJ e 1actor was not a ut- or cause m an emp oyment ecJsJOn. The only 
difference is that, under Price Waterhouse, this defense will apply to liability whereas under 
Title VII, the defense will apply to the remedies that will be available to the plaintiff. 175 As a 
practical matter though, the jury in both cases will have to go through the same confusing 
process of shifting burdens. There is, therefore, no justification for completely abandoning the 
Price Waterhouse framework on the basis of practical infeasibility when an almost identical 
framework is continuing to be used through its codification in a statute. 
Second, as previously noted, the Court in Gross did not overturn Price Waterhouse 
outright. Instead, the Court stated that it refused to extend the Price Waterhouse framework to 
the ADEA on the theory that any benefits that it would provide were outweighed by the 
problems in its application. 176 With regard to the ADA though, the Court would not really be 
extending the Price Waterhouse framework. As already discussed, based on the historical 
context of the ADA as well as its explicit link to Title VII, it is clear that Congress intended 
Price Waterhouse to apply just as much to the ADA as it did to Title VII. Thus, applying the 
Price Waterhouse framework to the ADA would merely be applying applicable case-law to a 
statute as Congress intended, not extending an inapplicable framework to a new statute. 
Finally, applying the Price Waterhouse framework to the ADA may seem appealing to 
those Justices who are set against granting ADA plaintiffs the full benefits of the Title VII 
framework. It is clear from the above analysis that the ADA and ADEA are very different 
174 Compare Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 244-45 (granting defendant employers an opportunity to escape liability 
tbrougb an affirmative defense in which the employer must disprove but-for causation), with 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
5(g)(2)(B) (2006) (limiting the remedies available to a Title VII plaintiff when the defendant employer is able to 
disproved but-for causation). 
175 See id. 
176 Gross, 557 U.S. at 180. 
32 
statutes. A court would be hard-pressed to deny the obvious intent of Congress to apply the 
same standard to both Title VII and ADA cases. But for those Justices who do not feel that ADA 
plaintiffs should be entitled to the Title VII mixed-motive standard, Price Waterhouse gives 
them a way out. Rather than finding that ADA plaintiffs are entitled to the Title VII mixed-
motive framework, these Justices may simply apply the Price Waterhouse framework as an 
alternative. The obvious differences between the ADA and ADEA make clear that Gross cannot 
be used to justifY a ruling that ADA plaintiffs have to prove "but-for" causation, but applying the 
Price Waterhouse framework may seem to be a fair compromise rather than being forced to 
apply the Title VII framework to ADA claims. 
V. Mixed-Motive Instructions as Applied to the ADAAA 
The amendments made to the ADA through the ADA Amendments Act of 2008 
(ADAAA) provide even further support that an ADA claimant, suing under the ADA as 
amended, is entitled to a mixed-motive standard. In 2008, Congress amended the ADA through 
the ADAAA. 177 These amendments were intended "to restore the intention and protections of 
the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, providing a clear and comprehensive national 
mandate for the elimination of discrimination on the basis of disability."178 For purposes of this 
Comment, the most relevant amendment is the one that was made to the ADA's causational 
language. Before the ADAAA took effect, the ADA stated that a disabled individual could not 
be discriminated against "because of' his disability. 179 But the ADAAA amended this language 
so that it now states that a disabled individual cannot be discriminated against "on the basis of' 
177 ADA Amendments Act of2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 
12101-12213 (2009)). 
178 H.R. REP. No. 110-730, pt. I, at 4. 
179 42 U.S.C. § 12112 (2006). 
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his disability. 180 Since this amendment is not effective retroactively, recent cases involving a 
question of the appropriate standard of causation in ADA cases have not had the opportunity to 
analyze the new language.181 But considering the emphasis that court decisions have placed on 
the phrase "because of' in these types of cases, the change in language to "on the basis of' may 
significantly alter a court's analysis.182 
For example, one obvious impact of this change in language is that it significantly limits 
the reliance that can be placed on Gross. The "because of' language was crucial to the Court's 
holding in Gross. After consulting a dictionary, the Court concluded that the plain meaning of 
the phrase "because of' required but-for causation. 183 But since the ADAAA replaced this 
language, the plain language consideration in Gross involving the definition of "because of' is 
no longer applicable to the analysis set forth here. 
Moreover, the plain language of the phrase "on the basis of' is significantly broader than 
the phrase "because of." Contrary to the assertion in Gross that "because of' means the same 
thing as "on the basis of,"184 at least with regard to the ADAAA, this conclusion cannot logically 
apply. The very fact that Congress amended the language from "because of' to "on the basis of' 
implies that Congress intended for these two phrases to mean different things with respect to the 
ADAAA. If Congress intended for "because of' and "on the basis of' to mean exactly the same 
180 42 U.S.C. § 12112 (2009). 
181 See, e.g., Serwatka v. Rockwell Automation, Inc., 591 F.3d 957, 961 n.l (7th Cir. 2010). 
182 As a preliminary matter, it should be noted that this new language does not render the previous discussion in this 
Comment moot. As noted above. the ADAAA does not apply retroactively, so there are still cases currently being 
decided nnder the original wording ofthe ADA. See. e.g., Lewis v. Humboldt Acquisition Corp., Inc., 681 F.3d 312 
(6th Cir. 2012). Moreover, a court may decide that the new causationallanguage of the ADAAA does not affect the 
analysis, in which case the arguments made in Parts III and IV supra are still highly relevant. Furthermore. since the 
ADAAA merely amends the original ADA and, thus, stems from the same historical context, it must be viewed in 
the same light discussed in Parts III and IV supra. The history regarding court interpretations of the original 
"because of' language is needed in order to nnderstand the significance of this new change in language. 
183 Gross v. FBL Fin. Serv., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 176 (2009). 
184 /d. at 176 (citing Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Burr, 551 U.S. 47, 63-64, 63 n.l4 (2007)). 
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thing with regard to disability discrimination, then there would have been no point in amending 
the language. 
Some dictionary definitions of the word "basis" include "'a relation that provides the 
foundation for something,' 'the most important or necessary part of something,' 'that which 
supports,' and 'the principal component part of a thing."'185 Each of these definitions implies 
that the "basis" is just one piece out of many that make something up. 186 As applied to the 
ADAAA then, an employment decision is made "on the basis of" disability when disability is 
simply one factor that makes up the employment decision.187 
The legislative history of the ADAAA provides even further support for the argument 
that the change in language to "on the basis of' was intended to ensure that ADAAA plaintiffs 
get the same mixed-motive standard as Title VII plaintiffs. According to an ADAAA House 
Report, the ADAAA changed the causationallanguage from "because of' to "on the basis of' in 
order to "[align] the construction of the Americans with Disabilities Act with Title VII of the 
Civil Rights Act of 1964 .... "188 It also states that "[t]he bill amends Section 102 of the ADA to 
mirror the structure of nondiscrimination protection in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 
changing the language of Section 102(a) from prohibiting discrimination against a qualified 
individual 'with a disability because of the disability of such individual' to prohibiting 
discrimination against a qualified individual 'on the basis of disability."' 189 This Report 
explicitly states that Congress changed the causational language of the ADA in order to mirror 
185 William D. Goren, Americans with Disabilities Act Claims: Is a Mixed Motive Jury Instruction Dead?, 24 DCBA 
28,32 (2012) (citing Webster's Online Dictionary, http:// www.websters-online-dictionary.org/definitionlbasis) (last 
visited Apr. 16, 2013). 
186 /dat31. 
187 Id 
188 H.R. REP. No. 110-730, pt. I, at 6. 
189 !d. (emphasis added). 
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Title VII. 190 This demonstrates a clear intent by Congress to grant the same causational standard 
under Title VII to plaintiffs who bring an action under the ADAAA. 
Furthermore, Congress was aware that many circuits were applying a "motivating-factor" 
standard in ADA cases when it passed the ADAAA. 191 If it so wished, Congress could have 
overruled these cases by explicitly including a new provision in the ADAAA making it clear that 
a mixed-motive standard is not the appropriate standard of causation for ADA cases. But 
Congress did not enact such a provision. Rather, Congress remained silent on the issue. This 
demonstrates an intent by Congress to ratify those holdings, and to confirm that ADA plaintiffs 
are entitled to a mixed-motive standard. Thus, between the actual causational language of the 
ADAAA ("on the basis of'), its legislative history, and the historical context in which the 
ADAAA was adopted, it is quite clear that a plaintiff suing under the ADAAA does not have to 
prove but-for causation. Rather, the employee must only prove that his disability played a role in 
his employer's adverse employment decision. 
VI. Conclusion 
Jurisprudence in employment discrimination since Gross has made it difficult, if not 
nearly impossible, for victims of discrimination to recover for the senseless losses that they have 
suffered. The unreasonably high standard of but-for causation cuts against the very 
underpinnings of employment discrimination laws, which reflect the understanding that 
discrimination serves no purpose in a civilized society, and should be eradicated. In the context 
of the ADA specifically, a but-for causation standard is unduly harsh in light of the 
l9D !d. 
191 From the time that the mixed-motive standard was laid out in the 1991 CRA, many circuits have held that a 
"motivating-factor" standard is the appropriate causationallevel with which to decide ADA cases rather than a 
straight forward "but-for" causation analysis. See, e.g., Head v. Glacier Nw. Inc., 413 F.3d 1053 (9th Cir. 2005); 
Parker v. Columbia Pictures Indus., 204 F.3d 326 (2d Cir. 2000); Foster v. Arthur Andersen, LLP, 168 F.3d 1029 
(7th Cir. 1999); Newberry v. E. Texas State Univ., 161 F.3d 276 (5th Cir. 1998); Katz v. City Metal Co., Inc., 87 
F.3d 26 (1st Cir. 1996); Pedigo v. P.A.M. Transp., Inc., 60 F.3d 1300 (8th Cir. 1995). 
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overwhelmingly copious evidence of legislative intent, demonstrating Congress's belief that 
ADA plaintiffs should only have to satisfy a mixed-motive standard. Look back to the 
hypothetical posited in the beginning of this Comment. It would be unduly burdensome to 
require the handicapped employee to jump extra hurdles in order to prevail on a claim of 
disability discrimination when it is uncontested that the employer was discriminating against her. 
Allowing an employer to escape liability in such a situation by requiring the employee to prove 
but-for causation undermines the policies behind the ADA and the ADAAA. Simply put, the 
analysis in Gross has no place in an ADA or ADAAA inquiry, and the opinions that have applied 
that analysis to such cases have clearly missed the mark. For all of the foregoing reasons, the 
mixed-motive standard is the appropriate standard of causation to apply to ADA and ADAAA 
cases. 
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